文章基本信息

标题：Economics of Long-Term Business Relationships
本地全文：下载
作者：Masao Nakamura
期刊名称：Journal of Business & Financial Affairs
电子版ISSN：2167-0234
出版年度：2013
卷号：2
期号：1
页码：1-1
DOI：10.4172/2167-0234.1000e123
语种：English
出版社：OMICS International
摘要：In his article in Business Week (“A Japanese buddy system that could benefit U.S. business,’ October 1991) Alan Blinder points out that while most American companies consider as the two alternative organizational forms for inter-firm relationships vertical integration and arm’s-length purchases in the marketplace and that different companies blend them in different proportions. We know well by now that the potential incentive issues for these organizational forms. Vertically integrated parts production being a part of a large assembly manufacturer like General Motors enjoys the advantage of a centrally controlled production system integrating the parts production into the assembly lines. But it could easily suffer from inefficiencies (the agency cost) arising from the firm’s large size. On the other hand, purchasing parts in the open market means the assembler may suffer from suppliers’ opportunistic behavior and the difficulty in synchronizing their parts delivery with the needs of the assembly lines.