文章基本信息

标题：Multiple-level principal-agent model under adverse selection
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作者：Pu-yan Nie
期刊名称：African Journal of Business Management
印刷版ISSN：1993-8233
出版年度：2010
卷号：4
期号：18
页码：4042-4048
语种：English
出版社：Academic Journals
摘要：Almost all principal-agent models focus on single level situation, while there exist numerous cases of principal-agent relation with multiple levels in practice. This paper develops principal-agent models with multiple levels based on subcontract phenomena. The corresponding properties about principal-agent models with multiple levels under adverse selection are explored. There exists twist of the quantity in subcontract. We also find that the efficiency of principal-agent with multiple levels is lower than that with single level.
关键词：Principal-agent model;multiple levels;incentive mechanisms;industrial organization;game theory