文章基本信息

标题：Supply chain coordination via a two-part tariff contract with price and sales effort dependent demand
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作者：Li, Q. ; Liu, Z.
期刊名称：Decision Science Letters
印刷版ISSN：1929-5804
电子版ISSN：1929-5812
出版年度：2015
卷号：4
期号：1
页码：27-34
语种：English
出版社：Growing Science Publishing Company
摘要：This paper studies the channel coordination between a supplier and a retailer with price and sales effort dependent demand. By means of game theory, we analyze price and sales effort decisions of the centralized supply chain. Then we consider three different contracts under decentralized model, i.e., wholesale price contract, cost-sharing contract and a two-part tariff contract, in which the supplier offers a contract comprising a wholesale price and a lump-sum fee to the retailer to coordinate the supply chain. Finally, we analyze the results to compare the equilibrium decisions under different contract scenarios. Our results show that both the wholesale price contract and the cost-sharing contract cannot coordinate the supply chain while the two-part tariff contract can effectively coordinate the supply chain.
关键词：Channel coordination;Contract;Game theory;Sales effort;Two-part tariff