文章基本信息

标题：Capital Adequacy, Deposit Insurance, and the Effect of Their Interaction on Bank Risk
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作者：Seksak Jumreornvong ; Chanakarn Chakreyavanich ; Sirimon Treepongkaruna 等
期刊名称：Journal of Risk and Financial Management
印刷版ISSN：1911-8074
出版年度：2018
卷号：11
期号：4
DOI：10.3390/jrfm11040079
语种：English
出版社：MDPI, Open Access Journal
摘要：This paper investigates how deposit insurance and capital adequacy affect bank risk forfive developed and nine emerging markets over the period of 1992–2015. Although full coverage ofdeposit insurance induces moral hazard by banks, deposit insurance is still an effective tool, especiallyduring the time of crisis. On the contrary, capital adequacy by itself does not effectively performthe monitoring role and leads to the asset substitution problem. Implementing the safety nets ofboth deposit insurance and capital adequacy together could be a sustainable financial architecture.Immediate-effect analysis reveals that the interplay between deposit insurance and capital adequacyis indispensable for banking system stability.
关键词：deposit insurance; capital adequacy; bank risk