文章基本信息

标题：Game-Theoretic Protection Against Networked SIS Epidemics by Human Decision-Makers
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作者：Ashish R. Hota ; Shreyas Sundaram
期刊名称：IFAC PapersOnLine
印刷版ISSN：2405-8963
出版年度：2019
卷号：51
期号：34
页码：145-150
DOI：10.1016/j.ifacol.2019.01.057
语种：English
出版社：Elsevier
摘要：AbstractWe study networks of human decision-makers who independently decide how to protect themselves against Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) epidemics. Motivated by studies in behavioral economics showing that humans perceive probabilities in a nonlinear fashion, we examine the impacts of such misperceptions on the equilibrium protection strategies. In our setting, nodes choose their curing rates to minimize the infection probability under the degree-based mean-field approximation of the SIS epidemic plus the cost of their selected curing rate. We establish the existence of a degree based equilibrium under both true and nonlinear perceptions of infection probabilities (under suitable assumptions). When the per-unit cost of curing rate is sufficiently high, we show that true expectation minimizers choose the curing rate to be zero at the equilibrium, while curing rate is nonzero under nonlinear probability weighting.
关键词：KeywordsGame TheoryNetwork GamesSIS EpidemicsBehavioral EconomicsProspect TheoryNonlinear Probability Weighting