文章基本信息

标题：Political Connection and the Demand for Industry Specialist Auditors
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作者：Li Zheng Brooks ; Li Zheng Brooks
期刊名称：Accounting and Finance Research
印刷版ISSN：1927-5986
电子版ISSN：1927-5994
出版年度：2016
卷号：5
期号：1
DOI：10.5430/afr.v5n1p210
语种：English
出版社：Sciedu Press
摘要：Prior literature suggests that political connected firms are more likely to be associated with lower financial reporting quality than non-political connected firms. Industry specialist auditors have a higher reputation to provide high quality audit. Thus, I hypothesize that political connected firms have a higher demand for industry specialists in order to minimize the agency costs associated with political connection. Consistent with my prediction, I find a significant positive association between political connection and the demand for industry specialist auditors. Additional analyses indicate that client firms with political connect firms and firms with industry specialists are less likely to switch auditors. Moreover, for client firms that do switch auditors, I find that higher propensity for political connected firms to engage in upward and lateral switches than non-political connected firms. This study furthers our understanding on the impact of political connection on auditor choice in a U.S. setting.
关键词：Political connection;Political contributions;Industry specialist auditors;Agency cost;Auditor switches