文章基本信息

标题：Reservation Price and Bundling for a Multiproduct Monopoly
本地全文：下载
作者：Qing Hu ; Qing Hu
期刊名称：American Journal of Economics
印刷版ISSN：2166-4951
电子版ISSN：2166-496X
出版年度：2015
卷号：5
期号：1
页码：37-42
DOI：10.5923/j.economics.20150501.05
语种：English
出版社：Scientific & Academic Publishing Co.
摘要：We consider a multiproduct firm that serves two markets. It monopolizes one market but competes with another firm in another market. We analyze the incentive for the multiproduct firm to bundle the monopolized product and the product of the competitive market. Based on the assumption that consumers’ preferences depend on “firm” rather than “product”, we show different results from the previous work. When the consumers’ reservation price is relatively low, bundling is not preferred. However, if the reservation price is relatively high, bundling happens for the purpose to foreclose the market and the multiproduct firm can earn monopoly profit in both markets.
关键词：Bundling; Multiproduct firm; Reservation price