文章基本信息

标题：A Conceptual Review of Agency Models of Performance Evaluation
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作者：Garba Salisu Balago ; Garba Salisu Balago
期刊名称：International Journal of Finance and Accounting
印刷版ISSN：2168-4812
电子版ISSN：2168-4820
出版年度：2014
卷号：3
期号：4
页码：244-252
DOI：10.5923/j.ijfa.20140304.04
语种：English
出版社：Scientific & Academic Publishing Co.
摘要：The contract existing between agent and principal in most cases does not yield the maximum satisfaction to both the principal and the agent due to dysfunctional behaviour. While the principal requires the maximum effort and cooperation of the agent to achieve his/her goal in the contract, the agent on other hand may be confronted with personal desires which often conflict with the goal of the agency contract. In order to achieve an optimal risk sharing position where both the principal and the agent will simultaneously attain their goal in the relationship, there is need for a framework or model which can be used to develop the necessary management control structures that will facilitate the achievement of goal congruence. The objective of the paper therefore, is to examine agency models by providing the conceptual and theoretical perspective as well as review some outstanding studies in the area with a view to appreciates its applicability to solving agency problems. From the review, we observed that agency models provides a coherent framework which can be used to analyse managerial accounting issues and can therefore be argued for adoption when investigating agent-principal problems facing firms.
关键词：Agency theory/model; Dysfunctional behaviour; Information asymmetry; Goal congruence