文章基本信息

标题：Bundling of Non-Complementary Products
本地全文：下载
作者：Qing Hu ; Qing Hu
期刊名称：Microeconomics and Macroeconomics
印刷版ISSN：2168-457X
电子版ISSN：2168-4588
出版年度：2015
卷号：3
期号：1
页码：1-6
DOI：10.5923/j.m2economics.20150301.01
语种：English
出版社：Scientific & Academic Publishing Co.
摘要：We extend the model of Matutes and Regibeau (1988) to examine the incentive to bundle in both monopoly and duopoly market. Matutes and Regibeau (1988) assumed the products were complementary products in a duopoly market. Under the assumption of complementary products, bundling and independent pricing is same for a monopoly. In a duopoly market, independent pricing is always preferred. We extend their model by assuming the products are non-complementary. By adding the single product consumption, we find different results. In a monopoly market, when the reservation price is relatively small, independent pricing dominates bundling and the sum of the prices of the products under independent pricing is higher than the bundle price. If reservation price is high, the results are opposite. In addition, the market can never be fully served under bundling as reservation price increases. In a duopoly market, we find that bundling may be preferred.
关键词：Bundling; Multiproduct firm; Reservation Price; Non-complementary products