文章基本信息

标题：Capital investment decision, corporate governance, and prospect theory
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作者：Yue-Fang Wen ; Yue-Fang Wen
期刊名称：Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences
印刷版ISSN：1877-0428
出版年度：2010
卷号：5
页码：116-126
DOI：10.1016/j.sbspro.2010.07.060
语种：English
出版社：Elsevier
摘要：AbstractThis paper investigates whether the effects of prospect theory exist in the decision making of corporate capital investment via the value function of cumulative prospect theory proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). With a reference point of firm performance, the change in annual capital investment ratio is taken as the proxy variable for value which reflects the utility obtained from gains or losses. By adopting the value function as the empirical model, irrational behavior of risk aversion, risk seeking, and loss aversion is observed. Besides, the evidences show that financial constraints cannot change the behavior of risk aversion when firms are facing gains, but the irrational behavior cannot be observed when variables of corporate governance structure are included, i.e. the corporate governance mechanism is functioning. On the other hand, no behavior of risk seeking is observed when firms are facing losses with the consideration of financial constraints or corporate governance.
关键词：Prospect theory;risk aversion;risk seeking