文章基本信息

标题：Group Testing Game
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作者：Sadegh Bolouki ; Mohammad Hossein Manshaei ; Vida Ravanmehr 等
期刊名称：IFAC PapersOnLine
印刷版ISSN：2405-8963
出版年度：2017
卷号：50
期号：1
页码：9668-9673
DOI：10.1016/j.ifacol.2017.08.2047
语种：English
出版社：Elsevier
摘要：AbstractGroup testing offers a cost/time-beneficial method to identify all, but few, infected individuals (defective items in general) among a large set of individuals (items). In a group testing scheme, a series of tests are performed on groups of individuals rather than single individuals. A test on a group determines whether the group contains at least one infected individual. This paper investigates the classical group testing problem from a game-theoretic perspective, where every individual, once called for a test, decides to comply with or defy the call. In this framework, an individual’s decision is driven by his knowledge of his well-being, that is healthy or infected. This leads to the so-called group testing game which is formulated in this work. Some simplified versions of the general game as a team game is then presented and analyzed, that result in some novel, generalized group testing problems to be addressed in future work.
关键词：KeywordsGroup TestingGame TheoryBayesian GamesTeam GamesNash Equilibrium