文章基本信息

标题：ALLIANCES IN THE SHADOW OF CONFLICT
本地全文：下载
作者：Changxia Ke ; Kai A. Konrad ; Florian Morath 等
期刊名称：Economic Inquiry
印刷版ISSN：0095-2583
出版年度：2015
卷号：53
期号：2
页码：854-871
DOI：10.1111/ecin.12151
语种：English
出版社：Western Economic Association International
摘要：Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. This article presents an experiment on the determinants of whether alliances break up and fight internally after having defeated a joint enemy. First, if peaceful sharing yields an asymmetric rent distribution, this increases the likelihood of fighting. In turn, anticipation of the higher likelihood of internal fight reduces the alliance's ability to succeed against the outside enemy. Second, the option to make nonbinding nonaggression declarations between alliance members does not make peaceful settlement within the alliance more likely. Third, higher differences in the alliance players' contributions to alliance effort lead to more internal conflict and more intense fighting. (JEL D72, D74)