文章基本信息

标题：Matching with slot‐specific priorities: Theory
本地全文：下载
作者：Scott Duke Kominers ; Scott Duke Kominers ; Tayfun Sönmez 等
期刊名称：Theoretical Economics
印刷版ISSN：1555-7561
出版年度：2016
卷号：11
期号：2
页码：683-710
DOI：10.3982/TE1839
语种：English
出版社：Econometric Society
摘要：We introduce a two‐sided, many‐to‐one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches that may have multiple slots available to accept contracts. Each slot has its own linear priority order over contracts; a branch chooses contracts by filling its slots sequentially, according to an order of precedence. We demonstrate that in these matching markets with slot‐specific priorities, branches' choice functions may not satisfy the substitutability conditions typically crucial for matching with contracts. Despite this complication, we are able to show that stable outcomes exist in the slot‐specific priorities framework and can be found by a cumulative offer mechanism that is strategy‐proof and respects unambiguous improvements in priority.
关键词：Market design matching with contracts stability strategy‐proofness school choice affirmative action airline seat upgrades C78 D47 D63 D78