文章基本信息

标题：Fairness and externalities
本地全文：下载
作者：Rodrigo A. Velez ; Rodrigo A. Velez
期刊名称：Theoretical Economics
印刷版ISSN：1555-7561
出版年度：2016
卷号：11
期号：1
页码：381-410
DOI：10.3982/TE1651
语种：English
出版社：Econometric Society
摘要：We study equitable allocation of indivisible goods and money among agents with other‐regarding preferences. First, we argue that Foley's (1967) equity test, i.e., the requirement that no agent prefers the allocation obtained by swapping her consumption with another agent, is suitable for our environment. Then we establish the existence of allocations passing this test for a general domain of preferences that accommodates prominent other‐regarding preferences. Our results are relevant for equitable allocation among inequity‐averse agents and in a domain with linear externalities that we introduce. Finally, we present conditions guaranteeing that these allocations are efficient.
关键词：Equity efficiency other‐regarding preferences equal income competitive allocations first welfare theorem C72 D63