文章基本信息

标题：Strategic complementarities and unraveling in matching markets
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作者：Federico Echenique ; Federico Echenique ; Juan Sebastián Pereyra 等
期刊名称：Theoretical Economics
印刷版ISSN：1555-7561
出版年度：2016
卷号：11
期号：1
页码：1-39
DOI：10.3982/TE1831
语种：English
出版社：Econometric Society
摘要：We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in matching markets. Our explanation is based on strategic complementarities and strategic unraveling. We identify a negative externality imposed on the rest of the market by agents who make early offers. As a consequence, an agent may make an early offer because she is concerned that others are making early offers. Yet other agents make early offers because they are concerned that others worry about early offers, and so on and so forth. The end result is that any given agent is more likely to make an early offer than a late offer.
关键词：Stable matching Gale–Shapley two‐sided matching unraveling strategic complementarities assortative matching C72 D78 D82