文章基本信息

标题：Rational expectations and farsighted stability
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作者：Bhaskar Dutta ; Bhaskar Dutta ; Rajiv Vohra 等
期刊名称：Theoretical Economics
印刷版ISSN：1555-7561
出版年度：2017
卷号：12
期号：3
页码：1191-1227
DOI：10.3982/TE2454
语种：English
出版社：Econometric Society
摘要：In the study of farsighted coalitional behavior, a central role is played by the von Neumann–Morgenstern (1944) stable set and its modification that incorporates farsightedness. Such a modification was first proposed by Harsanyi (1974) and was recently reformulated by Ray and Vohra (2015). The farsighted stable set is based on a notion of indirect dominance in which an outcome can be dominated by a chain of coalitional “moves” in which each coalition that is involved in the sequence eventually stands to gain. However, it does not require that each coalition make a maximal move, i.e., one that is not Pareto dominated (for the members of the coalition in question) by another. Consequently, when there are multiple continuation paths, the farsighted stable set can yield unreasonable predictions. We restrict coalitions to hold common, history independent expectations that incorporate maximality regarding the continuation path. This leads to two related solution concepts: the rational expectations farsighted stable set and the strong rational expectations farsighted stable set. We apply these concepts to simple games and to pillage games to illustrate the consequences of imposing rational expectations for farsighted stability.
关键词：Stable sets farsightedness consistency maximality rational expectations simple games pillage games C71 D72 D74