文章基本信息

标题：Career concerns with exponential learning
本地全文：下载
作者：Alessandro Bonatti ; Alessandro Bonatti ; Johannes Hörner 等
期刊名称：Theoretical Economics
印刷版ISSN：1555-7561
出版年度：2017
卷号：12
期号：1
页码：425-475
DOI：10.3982/TE2115
语种：English
出版社：Econometric Society
摘要：This paper examines the interplay between career concerns and market structure. Ability and effort are complements: effort increases the probability that a skilled agent achieves a one‐time breakthrough. Wages are based on assessed ability and on expected output. Effort levels at different times are strategic substitutes and, as a result, the unique equilibrium effort and wage paths are single‐peaked with seniority. Moreover, for any wage profile, the agent works too little, too late. Commitment to wages by competing firms mitigates these inefficiencies. In that case, the optimal contract features piecewise constant wages and severance pay.
关键词：Career concerns experimentation career paths up‐or‐out reputation D82 D83 M52