文章基本信息

标题：Board interlocking in Brazil: Director participation in multiple companies and its effect on the value of firms
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作者：Rafael Liza Santos ; Alexandre Di Miceli da Silveira
期刊名称：Brazilian Review of Finance
印刷版ISSN：1984-5146
出版年度：2007
卷号：5
期号：2
页码：125-163
语种：Portuguese
出版社：Link to the Brazilian Society of Finance
摘要：This paper investigates the simultaneous participation of directors in different companies from 320 Brazilian listed firms in 2003 and 2005. We identify which firms are connected through a network of directors, which corporate characteristics contribute to this phenomenon, and if board interlocking influences firm value and operational performance. The results show that interlocking directorates are a common practice in Brazil. Besides, larger boards, more dispersed ownership structures, and larger firm size are factors associated with a high level of board interlocking. Moreover, we find that firm value is, on average, negatively impacted by higher levels of board interlocking, especially on firms with board of directors considered too busy (those in which a majority of directors hold three or more directorships) or on firms where their CEO hold directorships in other companies. Besides being a pioneer work on this field in Latin America, the paper provides subsides for the preparation of good corporate governance practices from regulators regarding the effectiveness of multiple directorships and its consequences for corporate value.
其他摘要：This paper investigates the simultaneous participation of directors in different companies from 320 Brazilian listed firms in 2003 and 2005. We identify which firms are connected through a network of directors, which corporate characteristics contribute to this phenomenon, and if board interlocking influences firm value and operational performance. The results show that interlocking directorates are a common practice in Brazil. Besides, larger boards, more dispersed ownership structures, and larger firm size are factors associated with a high level of board interlocking. Moreover, we find that firm value is, on average, negatively impacted by higher levels of board interlocking, especially on firms with board of directors considered too busy (those in which a majority of directors hold three or more directorships) or on firms where their CEO hold directorships in other companies. Besides being a pioneer work on this field in Latin America, the paper provides subsides for the preparation of good corporate governance practices from regulators regarding the effectiveness of multiple directorships and its consequences for corporate value.
关键词：Corporate Governance;Corporate Finance;Finanças Corporativas;Governança Corporativa
其他关键词：Business;Corporate Governance; Corporate Finance;G32; G34