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  • 标题:Ciclos Políticos e Resultados Eleitorais: Um Estudo sobre o Comportamento do Eleitor Brasileiro
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Marcos Yamada Nakaguma ; Siegfried Bender
  • 期刊名称:Revista Brasileira de Economia
  • 印刷版ISSN:0034-7140
  • 出版年度:2010
  • 卷号:64
  • 期号:1
  • 页码:3-24
  • 语种:English
  • 出版社:Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV
  • 摘要:This paper investigates the determinant causes of the existence of political budget cycles in Brazilian Federal States. We propose a methodology to decompose the political cycles in order to identify the portions that are due to opportunism and to the signaling activity of governors. The aim is to investigate whether the electorate is capable of: (1) capture the competence signals sent by governors; and (2) identify and punish opportunistic politics. The results indicate that the electorate rewards opportunistic cycles in both revenue and public spending. As for the competence portion of the cycles, our results indicate that competence signaling occurs mainly through the budget revenue variables.
  • 其他摘要:This paper investigates the determinant causes of the existence of political budget cycles in Brazilian Federal States. We propose a methodology to decompose the political cycles in order to identify the portions that are due to opportunism and to the signaling activity of governors. The aim is to investigate whether the electorate is capable of: (1) capture the competence signals sent by governors; and (2) identify and punish opportunistic politics. The results indicate that the electorate rewards opportunistic cycles in both revenue and public spending. As for the competence portion of the cycles, our results indicate that competence signaling occurs mainly through the budget revenue variables.
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