文章基本信息

标题：Secure Universal Designated Verifier Signature and its Variant for Privacy Protection
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作者：Lin ; Han-Yu
期刊名称：Information Technology And Control
印刷版ISSN：2335-884X
出版年度：2013
卷号：42
期号：3
页码：268-276
DOI：10.5755/j01.itc.42.3.3532
语种：English
出版社：Kaunas University of Technology
摘要：Based on the bilinear inverse Diffie-Hellman problem (BIDHP), we first propose a provably secure probabilistic signature scheme. Furthermore, we extend it into two universal designated verifier signature (UDVS) schemes under the same computational assumption. The first one is a conventional UDVS scheme for one designated verifier while the other is designed for cooperative multi-verifier. UDVS schemes aim at protecting the privacy of signature holders and have practical benefits to the applications, e.g., the certificate for medical records and income summary, etc. The comparison results demonstrate that the signature generation and designation of our scheme are both pairing-free, which could benefit the application of devices with constrained computation. We also give formal security proofs of unforgeability against existential forgery under adaptive chosen-message attacks (EF-CMA) in the random oracle model. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5755/j01.itc.42.3.3532
其他摘要：Based on the bilinear inverse Diffie-Hellman problem (BIDHP), we first propose a provably secure probabilistic signature scheme. Furthermore, we extend it into two universal designated verifier signature (UDVS) schemes under the same computational assumption. The first one is a conventional UDVS scheme for one designated verifier while the other is designed for cooperative multi-verifier. UDVS schemes aim at protecting the privacy of signature holders and have practical benefits to the applications, e.g., the certificate for medical records and income summary, etc. The comparison results demonstrate that the signature generation and designation of our scheme are both pairing-free, which could benefit the application of devices with constrained computation. We also give formal security proofs of unforgeability against existential forgery under adaptive chosen-message attacks (EF-CMA) in the random oracle model. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5755/j01.itc.42.3.3532
关键词：probabilistic signature;universal designated verifier signature;bilinear inverse Diffie-Hellman problem;privacy-preserving;random oracle