出版社:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas
摘要:This article examines the features of the Spanish Military-Fiscal State of Charles III. We have compared the Spanish state with Britain in order to revise Barbier and Klein´s thesis about how the military priorities of Charles III restricted the modernization of his state and caused the monarchy´s fall into debt and bankruptcy. The British case demonstrates how its own success was based on the establishment of a Military-Fiscal State and the constant military activity driven by an aggressive mercantile policy. We conclude that the Military-Fiscal State in Charles III´s Spain was not as well-developed as that of contemporary Great Britain. Spain devoted fewer resources to war, maintained a minimum military activity, and the mobilisation of resources lacked the flexibility found in Britain´s case. All this, along with a profound distrust in the use of public debt as the main way to fund war, meant that Charles III´s state did not become a real “war machine” as did George III´s state. In this article we propose that the weakness of Charles III lay in his limited interest in the development of a true Military-Fiscal State.